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Abstract 
The Safety and Failure Event Network (SAFE-NET) method of accident modelling has been developed as part of a human 
factors research project which aimed to identify the relationships of contributing factors (including human factors) to major 
railway safety occurrences for the Rail Safety Regulator in Queensland, Australia. Whilst accident modelling had certainly 
progressed through various reiterations since the first simple linear model was developed, the identified gap has been for a 
practical methodology for undertaking accident modelling which can now cope with modern day system complexity and truly 
reflect the socio-technical systems under review. The aim of this research was to identify the contributing factors to railway 
safety occurrences and to examine how contributing factors were interconnected and networked. To meet this aim major 
railway safety occurrence reports which were submitted to the Rail Safety Regular, for a five year period (2006 – 2010), were 
analysed and data was collected on the contributing factors using the Contributing Factors Framework (CFF), a human factors 
tool developed for the rail industry in Australia. The contributing factors for various types of safety occurrences were then 
modelled using the Safety and Failure Event Network (SAFE-Net) method. The results have enabled various types of railway 
safety occurrences to be modelled with a view to understanding how the contributing factors are interconnected and which 
factors are the main contributors to various types of safety occurrences. This representation allows management and others to 
review the railway system elements at a deeper level and enable the focus of safety efforts to be directed to the most important 
and central elements from a systems perspective. 
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Fig. 1. Heinrich – Domino Theory. 
1. Accident modelling 
The ongoing development of accident modelling appears to have been somewhat sluggish when one looks at its 
development over the last 85 years, but it has nevertheless been an interesting journey for the field of accident 
analysis and phenomenology. Accident modelling was founded in the early industrial era and the first actual model 
demonstrated, through a visual picture, a sequence of events which were thought to transpire for a safety 
occurrence to eventuate. The fist accident model, as shown in Figure 1, was developed in 1931 by Herbert 
Heinrich [1] and was known as the Domino Model. 
From this early industrial age the concept of ‘modelling accidents’ began in an attempt to explain how accidents 
come about. Accident models give a visual picture of how safety occurrences (accident, incidents and near misses) 
were understood to evolve showing the trajectory of factors which contributed to the event. This understanding 
would then enable measures to be taken with a view to preventing them from reoccurring again in the future, a 
safety goal which still exists today.  
The well known picture (see Figure 1) of five dominos lined up and assigned names to represent the 
contributing factors to such events, herald in the desire to visually demonstrate and model safety occurrences. 
Accident models attempt to demonstrate the path or trajectory of key elements which lead to negative safety events 
and therefore instil knowledge so that these events may be prevented in the future. 
1.1. Historical developments 
Various reiterations of accidents models have been developed over the years as knowledge and understanding of 
how safety events occur has increased. Well known and recognised models, such as James Reason’s [2] Swiss 
Cheese Model developed in the 1990’s, have held a prominent place in the safety field. However the recognition 
that accident modelling needs to better represent the complex social-technical world of modern day work has also 
now been recognised. 
The call for accident modelling to move away from the old and narrow view of linear modelling of safety 
occurrences can be attributed to have come from Floyd Allport [3] as early as 1950. Allport recognised that 
accidents do not occur in a strictly linear fashion. This realization however did not transfer into the accident 
modelling realm at that time in any solid fashion and models predominately continued to reflect some type of event 
linear progression.  
What had been widely accepted by safety researchers [1,2,4] was that safety occurrences were not solely due to 
individual operator error (active errors) but lay in the wider systemic organisational factors (latent conditions) in 
the upper levels of the organisation. 
Whilst safety systems theories now recognised that accidents involved all elements in a system, Hollnagel’s 
initial Functional Resonance Accident Model (FRAM) [5] was perhaps the first attempt to visually display 
elements in a system which demonstrated a network or linkage of the system elements (see Figure 2). 
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Fig. 2. Hollnagel – Functional Resonance Accident Model. 
This was a positive move away from the previously conceptually limited and restrictive linear sequential 
models. Hollnagel [5] recognised that forces (being humans, technology, latent conditions and barriers) did not 
simply combine linearly thereby leading to an incident or accident and whilst his FRAM network research is still 
currently being developed and refined, an attempt at modelling accidents for complex systems had now begun.  
This new generation of thinking about accident modelling as non-linear combinations of mutually interacting 
variables necessitates that the combinations of multiple factors in these systems, and the relationship of the factors 
to each other, need to be studied, examined and understood if more accurate insights of what occurs in real world 
complex socio-technical environments is to be gained. Continuing advances in the use of computer software 
programs which can now offer enhanced visual displays of these concepts and ideas, now allow data to be 
examined through a new lens. The use of Social Network Analysis (SNA) software is one such advance and has 
been used in this research to offer a new understanding of how the contributing factors involved in safety 
occurrences combine; how they are linked; and which factors contribute the most to an incident. 
1.2. Traditional modelling limitations 
Linked closely to the concept of the traditional linear accident models of safety occurrences is the way that data 
analysis in safety occurrence investigation has also been limited to results being understood by the number 
counting contributing factors. When looking at contributing factors in accident analysis, the factors identified as 
having occurred during the event take the form of nominal count data. Any contributing factors which are not 
identified are taken as ‘did not occur’ and those contributing factors which are identified are taken as ‘did occur’ 
and number counted. Analysis then is limited to the understanding of what can be gleamed by charts, or other 
means of displaying number counts. An example is shown in Figure 3 where the contributing factors for Running 
Line Derailments for the years 2006 to 2010 have been counted and are shown grouped by colour into three 
contributing factor headings (taken from the Contributing Factors Framework (CFF) [6] tool used for this analysis) 
being Individual/Team Actions (yellow), Technical Failures (green) and Local Conditions/Organisational factors 
(blue).  
1737 Karen Klockner and Yvonne Toft /  Procedia Manufacturing  3 ( 2015 )  1734 – 1741 
Fig. 3. Running Line Derailments (1.1) Top 6 Factors by Number Count Grouped by CFF Sub-Headings. 
This has lead to contributing factors being primarily understood by their importance on a numbered scale. This 
relegates a true understanding of a factors importance in the big picture to how often they have been identified as 
occurring and does enable an analysis of any interaction amongst the factors. 
2. Accident modelling for social-technical systems 
This research came about due to frustrations around the limitations of knowledge able to be gained about 
accident phenomenology using traditional models and resulting data analysis methods. It was interested in gaining 
a better understanding of the relationships between contributing factors and being able to determine more 
specifically the level of contribution of factors in various types of railway safety occurrences and re-occurrences. 
In examining network analysis techniques it became apparent that the key to developing accident models which 
reflected complex socio-technical systems may lay in modern day computer programs being used for Social 
Network Analysis (SNA). SNA offered the ability to transform data to enable it to be visualised as both a visual 
network and in a statistical form suitable for network analysis, predominately including ‘measures of centrality’. In 
this research “Betweenness Centrality” was predominately examined which looks at how much removing a factor 
would disrupt the connections between the other factors in the network. SNA lends itself to the study of many 
different types of interactions, with connections able to represent any type of relationship from friendships, to 
exchange of money, professional relationships or connections between actors/things, in this case contributing 
factors.  
The use of information visualisation using social network analysis for this research made sense given that one 
of the aims of the research was to examine the interactions of the contributing factors as a network of connections 
in a larger system with a view to having a ‘model’ as a resulting outcome.  
What was needed was a method of how the safety occurrence contributing factors could be operationalised into 
a relationship scenario. This came about by viewing contributing factors could be as individuals who ‘knew’ and 
‘met’ each other every time they showed up (were identified as having contributed) at an accident or other safety 
occurrence (the event). If they were present at the event, then they met all the other factors that also showed up at 
the event. The data on which factors showed up at each event, and hence knew/met each of the other factors at that 
same event, could be investigated using SNA. This would enable an examination of how the contributing factors 
were networking for each type of event under study. Information visualisation using SNA offered a method that 
both resulted in an accident model and aided the understanding of the actual contribution by each factor to safety 
occurrences through the examination of centrality measures which determine the relative position of the 
contributing factor within the larger network. 
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3. Method 
Firstly data on contributing factors was collected by applying the Contributing Factors Framework (CFF) [4] to 
Major Railway Safety occurrence reports submitted by rail transport operations to the Rail Safety Regulator in 
Queensland for the years 2006 to 2010. The CFF is a framework developed to assist the rail industry in Australia 
identify the contributing factors in rail safety investigations and enables the identification of contributing factors 
across three main headings, being Individual/Team factors, Technical Failures and Local Conditions & 
Organisational factors. A total of 429 safety occurrences were analysed using the CFF and for each safety 
occurrences the contributing factors were identified. 
This research was specifically interested in four types of high risk railway incidents being Collisions, 
Derailments, Safe Working Irregularity/Breaches and Signals Passed at Danger and the contributing factors for 
various sub types of these events were modelled using SAFE-Net method which uses a SNA program.  
To allow the contributing factors data to be entered into a SNA program it was required to be reformatted. As 
SNA is based traditionally on the connections between people (or other entities) it was necessary to link 
contributing factors to each other. The linking or connection of factors was therefore operationalised by viewing 
each safety occurrence as an ‘event’ as described above.  
This allowed relationships between contributing factors to be established for each safety occurrence reviewed. 
Meetings between contributing factors therefore becomes the basis of the resultant accident model which shows 
who met who and how many times they met over multiple events. Patterns of reoccurrences of meetings for safety 
occurrences types could then be established. 
4. Safety And Failure Event Network (SAFE-Net) 
To begin the process, the original data obtained on the contributing factors for rail safety occurrences was 
required to be converted into relational data, as the use of a SNA method requires that there is a connection 
between one contributing factor and another contributing factor, a mutual (social or other relationship) 
connectedness.  
Traditional data was therefore converted into a social format by linking together any two factors that were 
identified as attending the same safety occurrence (event). An example is provided below for the three factors that 
attended one safety occurrence. The three factors are ‘Fatigue’, ‘Business Planning’ and ‘Training’. The 
relationship for the three factors meeting each other would be as shown below, where Fatigue meets Business 
Planning, Fatigue meets Training and Business Planning meets Training: 
 
x Fatigue ↔ Business Planning 
x Fatigue ↔ Training 
x Business Planning ↔ Training 
 
Fatigue has a mutual or reciprocal (undirected) relationship with both the other factors of Business Planning and 
Training. Business Planning and Training also have the same type of relationship with each other. All factors who 
were identified as being present at the time of the occurrence met each other. 
The method then involves making a lists of these relationships for each safety occurrence.  
Once the data was converted into relational data and entered into an Excel spreadsheet, it could be entered into 
SNA programs to enable the program to both calculate centrality measures for each factor and show models of the 
safety occurrence under review. The main SNA program used for modelling of the safety occurrences in this 
research was TouchGraph [7]. Once the data is entered into the SNA program, many variations of both the 
resulting models and the measures of centrality data can then be examined, depending on the area of interest. 
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5. SAFE-Net models 
The use of the SAFE-Net method results in an accident model for each type of safety occurrence under review. 
The data on contributing factors for various types of railway safety occurrences was gathered for a 5 year period 
and therefore gives a model of how re-occurring types of safety occurrences can be viewed. Whilst one off, 
individual safety occurrences can also be modelled, in figure 4 the contributing factors for Signals Passes at 
Danger (SPAD) Driver Misjudged for a five year period have been shown as an accident model using the SAFE-
Net method.  
In this model the yellow factors represent Individual/Team actions at the time of the occurrence, green factors 
represent Technical Failures and blue factors represent Local Conditions/Organisational factors based on the CFF. 
The halos (circles) around the factors show Betweenness Centrality measures from large to small being highest 
Betweenness Centrality to lowest Betweenness Centrality respectively. 
Models produced by the SAFE-Net method can be manipulated to reveal previously unknown information 
about the relationship and networks of the factors contributing to re-occurring safety occurrences. 
Fig. 4. SPAD Driver Misjudged - Model of Factors with Betweenness Centrality Greater than 10. 
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Fig. 5. Collisions - Model of Betweenness Centrality for Local Conditions & Organisational Factors by Sub-Group Headings. 
Flexibility in the method allows models to also be produced which can examine micro or macro organisational 
issues. In examining organisational management areas of interest, models can be viewed by singling out factors by 
examining the sub headings under which they fall.  
Figure 5 shows a model of Collisions where only the Local Conditions and Organisational factors have been 
viewed using their sub-headings in the CFF. 
Here it can be seen that factors falling under the category of ‘Organisational management’ play a role however 
the factors which fall under category of ‘Knowledge skills & experience’ have the highest Betweenness Centrality 
measures in the network (as indicated by halo size) and would therefore be of the greatest interest in examining 
their relationship and influence to the other factors in the network. 
6. Summary 
In reviewing the SAFE-Net method models, each type of safety occurrence appears to have its own contributing 
factor footprint, and each SAFE-Net model for the various types of safety occurrences reveals a different set of 
relationships between the factors. The resultant accident model for each type of occurrence provides a specific and 
unique model of those factors that are contributing for each type of occurrence based on their relationship to the 
other factors in the model. What does become apparent is that this supports complex systems theory where “the 
whole is based upon cooperation and competition among its parts, and in the process certain constituents gain 
dominance over the others” (p.14) [8]. 
Not only are the relationships revealed, but also the contribution of each identified contributing factor can be 
determined to understand their importance (centrality) in the whole network. Whilst importance in the traditional 
data analysis was limited to those with the highest number counts, importance can now be calculated using specific 
centrality measures. Whilst Betweenness Centrality has been the measure of choice here, many others can be 
examined which can provide a wealth of information about contributing factor influence and value. The ability to 
now display and explore this information is much greater and can ultimately provide several lenses through which 
to look at accident modelling options. 
It has been demonstrated that the SAFE-Net models can be expanded or reduced (filtered) to reveal more or less 
factors, displaying a more interesting and comprehensive view on which factors are the ‘most important’ and 
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offering a deeper understanding of the complex nature of the inter-relationships between the factors for the various 
types of safety occurrences under investigation. The SAFE-Net models, which originate from individual railway 
operator accident reports, provide an insight which the Rail Safety Regulator can use to provide information to the 
wider railway industry and community on what factors should be of interest in the prevention of various types of 
railway re-occurring safety occurrences. 
6. Conclusion 
Consideration has been given during the development of this research that the method needs to be transferable 
to other industries to allow for its uptake and use outside of the rail industry. The SAFE-Net method can be used 
for any data collected on the contributing factors to safety occurrences. Whilst individual organisations may need 
to determine their own set of conversion ‘rules’, the methodology appears sound for transferability.  
The primary contribution is the proof of a safety analysis methodology that elicits advanced information on the 
relationship between contributing factors for railway safety occurrences that allows previously unknown 
information to be obtained. The methodology developed here will enable accident modelling to move into the 
modern era and out of the limited linear era in which it has been stuck for some time. The ability to review safety 
occurrences as a relationship amongst the constituent parts and to better represent what are now termed complex 
socio-technical systems in the accident investigation world should be a welcome avenue of exploration for the 
safety analyst. 
The SAFE-Net methodology contribution is that it offers a solution that bridges the identified gap between 
theory and practice, offering a relatively easy pathway for enhancing knowledge and determining appropriate 
preventative actions in the real world. 
This research has contributed to the body of knowledge in the human factors, safety science and rail safety 
regulation disciplines by providing a methodology that allows safety occurrences to be modelled based on the 
contemporary understanding of the complex socio-technical systems in which they occur. The methodology, which 
has been called the SAFE-Net method, allows the jurisdictional Rail Safety Regulation branches to examine 
quantitatively and graphically the linkages between contributing factors at both a micro and macro level depending 
on the focus of the examination or level of interest. It provides answers on which factors are contributing the most 
for types of safety occurrences and reduces knowledge doubts and misdirection of safety actions. 
The importance of these contributions should not be treated lightly. The reoccurrence of major rail safety 
occurrences is a serious commercially and socially expensive reality. The SAFE-Net methodology offers a 
relatively straightforward means to enhance regulatory and organisational understanding and reduce risk. Its 
contribution to the understanding of complex system functioning by the recognition of the inter-relationships of 
parts of the system provides a collective knowledge where this was once not possible or available. Collective 
knowledge on contributing factors can now be captured, visualised, filtered and modelled to demonstrate how best 
to proactively manage these elements. 
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